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Abstract
The rapid development and diffusion of new technologies such as automation and
artificial intelligence makes life more convenient. At the same time, people may de-
velop overdependence on technology to simplify everyday tasks or to reduce the level
of effort required to accomplish them. We conduct a two-phase real-effort laboratory
experiment to assess how external assistance affects subsequent revealed preferences
for the convenience of a lower level of effort versus monetary rewards requiring greater
effort. The results suggest that men treated with external help in the first phase tend
to choose more difficult options with potentially higher monetary rewards. In contrast,
after being treated with external help, women exhibit a stronger propensity to utilize
the convenience of an easier task and are less likely to choose a more difficult option
that carries higher potential earnings.
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1 Introduction1
Artificial intelligence and smartphones integrate multiple features to facilitate everyday life2
to the point where many people are becoming addicted to their use (van Deursen et al., 2015).3
Today, remembering a telephone number or using a map to navigate to our destination are4
skills that are becoming obsolete. Middle school students develop dependency for information5
technology and the Internet to do their homework (Lei and Zhao, 2008). External help is6
not limited to technology. Helicopter parents provide excessive help to their children, who7
might consequently develop a dependency on their parents for doing almost everything.8
Nevertheless, there is also evidence that external help may have positive outcomes. For9
example, contrary to popular belief, a meta analysis conducted by Ellington (2003) shows10
that the use of calculators improves mathematical operational and problem solving skills.11
This paper aims to understand how the increasing reliance on external help may impact12
society.13
Although economists have been interested in studying human behavior related to “help”,14
the focus has been on people’s willingness to offer help (e.g., altruistic behavior). However,15
whether and how external assistance affects preferences and subsequent decision-making of16
the help recipients still remains an open question. The immediate benefits of receiving help17
are straightforward, but there may also be unintended consequences on subsequent behavior18
and performance. Motivated by the potential externalities of receiving assistance on the19
help recipients, we conduct a two-phase laboratory experiment to investigate how external20
assistance to a real-effort task in the first phase affects individual preferences for trading-off21
effort versus monetary rewards in a subsequent task. The potential effects of receiving help22
may impact future behavior and performance in two opposite ways. Individuals may use23
external help to boost their confidence and motivation to complete a task independently24
and even pursue more difficult tasks in the future. Meanwhile, it is also possible that the25
convenience from a lower level of effort —of receiving help— may erode human capital and26
crowd out intrinsic work ethic. Namely, people may develop a stronger dependency on27
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the external help, reducing their willingness to learn new skills and take on more difficult28
challenges. Determining the outcomes of external help is important for evaluating the welfare29
effects of business management strategies and policy interventions designed to provide people30
with external assistance.31
We pay particular attention to potential gender differences in reaction to external help.32
Gender composition is unbalanced in many fields, ranging from industry and politics to33
academia.1 There is ample evidence in the economics literature of significant gender differ-34
ences in risk attitudes and competition. Relevant to our study, a large body of literature35
originating in psychology, documents substantial gender differences in the consequences of36
receiving help (see Section 2 for a comprehensive discussion). If men and women also ex-37
perience differential impacts from external assistance, we believe it is critical to understand38
whether these asymmetric effects increase or reduce the prevalent gender gap.39
Our laboratory experiment consists of two stages. Participants were randomly assigned40
to the treatment or control group. Subjects in the control group performed a paid real-41
effort task without any assistance, while subjects in the treatment group performed the42
same task with external assistance, receiving hints for the right answers that simplified the43
task significantly. The second stage introduced a different real-effort task. In order to elicit44
the subjective relative evaluation of monetary rewards against the convenience of external45
assistance (i.e., less effort), before the second task began, subjects were allowed to choose46
a payment schedule and effort level through a multiple price list (MPL) (Holt and Laury,47
2002; Andersen et al., 2006). The MPL offered subjects an array of ordered scenarios (in48
rows) that differed in potential earnings and the amount of external help. For each row,49
subjects had to choose between option A, with 16 questions (accordingly lower potential50
earnings) and option B, with 24 questions (higher potential earnings). External help was51
again provided as hints that simplified the task. The number of hints in option A decreased52
1For example, women hold only 6.4% of Fortune 500 CEO roles (see http://fortune.com/2017/06/
07/fortune-women-ceos/). Female students tend to sort themselves out of STEM fields (see http://www.
joannejacobs.com/2014/03/fearing-bs-women-reject-stem-majors/)
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for each row of the MPL (from 16 to 0), while option B had a fixed number of hints (8).53
Consequently, the row in which a subject switched from option A to B provides a measure54
of his/her preference for the trade-off between the convenience of using external help and55
the extra effort required to obtain higher earnings (see the Appendix for a more detailed56
illustration).57
The experimental design tests whether—after being treated with external help in the58
first stage—subjects develop a behavioral dependency on its convenience or boost their59
confidence and motivation, leading them to perform the real-effort task with less external60
assistance in the second stage. The results show that, after being treated with help, men tend61
to overestimate their cognitive capability and underestimate the effort required to perform62
the real-effort tasks. Although there are no differences in performance by gender, men63
are overconfident and less likely to use external help. Women, on the other hand, exhibit64
a stronger propensity to utilize the convenience and choose a less challenging task in the65
second stage. We further explore the underlying mechanism of how cognitive bias affects66
individuals’ behavior by looking at differences in the switching patterns of the treatment67
and control groups conditional on the performance level.68
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses how our study relates69
to previous literature. Section 3 introduces the experimental design. Section 4 reports the70
general results. Section 5 concludes.71
2 Related Literature72
Using external help as the treatment links our study to an abundant literature in psychology73
examining “reactions to help.” A review of literature helps to understand the roots of our74
findings. Fisher et al. (1982) argue that the effects of help are mixed, inducing either self-75
threatening or self-supportive experiences for the help recipients. On one hand, receiving76
help may hurt self-esteem by implied inferiority, inadequacy, and dependency. On the other77
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hand, help can also be perceived as positive and supportive, often resulting in material gains78
(Nadler and Jeffrey, 1986).79
Reactions to help differ by gender. The “threat to self-esteem” model suggests that80
when men receive help from a person with similar experience, it lowers their self-confidence.81
However, help can also provide stronger self-confidence if the giver has more experience82
(Fisher and Nadler, 1974; Nadler et al., 1976, 1979). Receiving help does not seem to harm83
the self-esteem and performance of women (DePaulo et al., 1981; Daubman and Lehman,84
1993). Women are more inclined to admit that they need assistance and appreciate the help,85
while men experience more self-doubt. In our experiment, we find that after being treated86
with help, men have a stronger propensity to demonstrate their confidence by choosing a more87
challenging option, while women tend to develop greater dependency on the convenience of88
lower effort.289
There is a small but growing literature in experimental economics that discusses gender90
differences in responding to external advice. For instance, Brandts et al. (2014) point out91
that external advice from an experienced person has different impacts on men and women’s92
work efficiency and competition entry in a real-effort task. They mainly focus on the impacts93
of external advice on the decision to enter a tournament, while our experiment examines the94
extent to which external assistance can affect confidence and effort in a subsequent task.95
Heikensten and Isaksson (2018) examine how the gender of the advisors influences individu-96
als’ advice-seeking decision and whether this impact is heterogenous across genders. While97
they focus on the gender of influencers, our design concentrates on the influencees’ willingness98
to receive subsequent help after a training session and the potential gender differences from99
them. Notably, a major difference between previous studies and ours is that the external100
help in our experiment is provided by a computer rather than another person. Hence, the101
2It is noteworthy that in the above-mentioned research in psychology, the experimental design deliber-
ately leads subjects to believe that their performance is a reflection of their intellectual abilities. In most
cases researchers also lead participants to believe that they performed significantly worse than their peers.
In order to avoid contamination from potential self-doubt and negative feelings, we did not provide subjects
negative or positive feedback about their performance until the end of the experiment.
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results of our experiment are more suitable for understanding the effects of non-human help.102
Our experiment also mirrors a large literature on gender differences in risk preferences and103
competition (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund,104
2011; Reuben et al., 2015; Buser et al., 2017; van Veldhuizen, 2017). A notable finding in this105
literature is that men and women have remarkable differences in their propensity to engage106
in competitive behaviors. To be specific, women shy away from competition, while men are107
more competitive, even in tasks in which they are not more capable than women (Niederle108
and Vesterlund, 2007; Wieland and Sarin, 2012; Buser et al., 2014). In field experiments of109
intellectual (Gneezy et al., 2003) and physical competition (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004),110
men show greater effort and better performance in a competitive environment, while women’s111
performance remains unchanged regardless of the environment’s competitive level.112
More closely related to the findings in our study, previous research suggests that men113
seem to gain self-esteem by demonstrating that they are better than others (Schwalbe and114
Staples, 1991; Josephs et al., 1992; Crocker et al., 2003). In contrast, Gu¨nther et al. (2010)115
find that women avoid competing with men, even in areas where women wrongly believe116
they have lower performance. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that about one third of117
the gender gap in tournament entry can be explained by gender differences in confidence.118
Therefore, our experiment is complimentary to studies on gender differences related to over-119
confidence and self-esteem.3 Overconfidence may be useful to explain our experimental result120
showing that after receiving help, men have greater willingness to take the challenge of a121
more difficult task.122
Our experiment differs from previous literature in that most past studies have compared123
gender differences in competition with other people. In contrast, our study focuses on gender124
differences in reaction to external help from technology, whereby our results provide useful125
3Note that these stylized findings may not be entirely driven by innate gender-specific characteristics.
Women’s under-performance in competitive environments also depends on the task (Gu¨nther et al., 2010;
Dreber et al., 2011; Shurchkov, 2012; Wieland and Sarin, 2012), the gender composition of the competing
group (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Gupta et al., 2013), stereotype and information con-
ditions (Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2016), and cultural and social norms (e.g., patriarchal society vs. matrilineal
society) (Gneezy et al., 2009).
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insights into external help change in labor markets driven by technological development.126
3 Experimental Design127
The experiment has two stages. The first stage is a real-effort task consisting of ten questions128
with five lines of text; each line contains a random combination of 50 letters. We used the 26129
lowercase letters of the English alphabet to construct the question. Participants were asked130
to count the number of times a predetermined letter appeared in the text. In the treatment,131
participants were provided with external help in the form of hints that significantly simplified132
the task. The presence of hints made all irrelevant letters less salient—although they were133
still present—to simplify the counting task (see Figure 1).134
Insert Figure 1 here.135
Participants first viewed sample questions, with or without hints, and then began to136
work on the ten questions. A timer displayed in the right corner of the screen counted137
the time used for each question. The timer gave participants a sense of the level of effort138
required to complete the task with and without help. Each participant had an equal chance139
of being randomly assigned to the treatment group, where they would work with the hints,140
or to the control group, where they would work without hints. In order to complete the141
first-stage task, participants had to correctly answer all ten questions. Although the task142
is not difficult, it requires effort to complete it. Obviously, higher effort is required in the143
control condition (without hints) compared to the treatment condition (with hints). Over144
the course of implementing the first-stage task, subjects were not allowed to proceed to the145
next question until they provide the correct answer for each question. Participants were146
allowed multiple attempts to enter the right answer to each question. They can only proceed147
to the next question when the correct answer was filled in. As such, at the end of the first148
stage, all participants earned $10 for completing the task, in which we avoid the potential149
income effects.150
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The main purpose of the first stage was to randomly treat half of the subjects with151
external help (i.e., the hints for the right answers that significantly simplify the task). We152
hypothesize that this hint treatment would influence an individual’s preference for trading153
off payment for receiving in the subsequent stage.154
In the second stage, each subject was randomly assigned with equal probability to either155
another real-effort task or a Raven’s test. Again, participants were provided with sample156
questions before performing the task. The real-effort questions in the second stage were very157
similar to the questions in the first stage, with the only difference that the second stage158
used numbers instead of letters. An example of a Raven’s test question is shown in Figure159
2. Analogous to the real-effort case, the hints suppressed some irrelevant answers helping160
individuals by reducing the answer pool.4161
Insert Figure 2 here.162
In order to elicit preferences for external help and monetary rewards, we presented par-163
ticipants with a multiple price list (MPL) before starting the second stage. As shown in164
Figure 3, participants were asked to make a choice between option A and B in each of 17165
scenarios. Option A had 16 questions and option B had 24 questions; hence option B always166
has higher potential earnings. The number of hints in option A is descending in the list167
from 16 in the first row to 0 in the last row, while the number of hints in option B is fixed168
at 8. Note that the attractiveness of option A decreases by each decision row. This can be169
easily illustrated by comparing the first two rows in Figure 3. In the first row, subjects face170
a trade-off between option A, which would pay $16 with a very high probability, since there171
are 16 questions and 16 hints, while option B has higher possible payoff because of more172
questions (24) but also requires greater effort because of fewer hints (8) under the same time173
limit. In the second row, option A becomes less attractive compared to the first row because174
4We use two types of task in the second stage. The goal was to detect whether behavioral patterns
induced in the first stage would be significantly adjusted due to the similarity of the task in the second stage.
Mann-Whitney U tests of the key indicators show there are no significant differences between the two types
of tasks.
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for the same number of questions (16) there are fewer hints (15). Accordingly, the subjects’175
willingness to select option A diminishes as the row number increases. The row number in176
which a subject switches from option A to B provides a measure of individual preferences177
for monetary rewards over external help. We argue that preferences are influenced by the178
hint treatment introduced in the first stage, which significantly simplifies the task. The179
earlier a subject switches from option A to B, the more evident that the subject is willing180
to forgo external help and choose a more difficult task with higher potential earnings. (See181
the Appendix section for a more sophisticated analysis.)182
Insert Figure 3 here.183
Subjects were informed that a lottery for the second stage would randomly determine184
one of the choice pairs to be realized. They had 20 minutes to complete the task, and each185
correct answer was worth $1. In order to collect earnings, subjects can not make errors in186
more than 25% of the questions.187
Otherwise, no payment would be delivered during this stage. The payment criterion188
was used to discourage subjects from always choosing option B based on strategic behavior.189
Since option B always has a higher potential payoff than option A, subjects would have a190
higher chance of earning more money by choosing option B if there is no restriction on the191
accuracy rate. In other words, to increase the salience of external assistance, we increased192
the difficulty of option B by enforcing this rule. This restriction is analogous to real labor193
markets, where worker’s performance is evaluated not only on the quantity, but also on194
the quality of their work. At the end of the experiment subjects filled a questionnaire,195
with demographic questions, including gender, race, religion, and ideology as well as self-196
evaluations regarding their performance in the experiment.197
The experiment was computerized using the software ‘z-Tree’ (Fischbacher, 2007) and198
conducted at Texas A&M University. We used a between-subject design and each subject199
participated in only one session. The duration of each session was approximately 60 minutes,200
including sign-up, consent, decision making, and payment. Before entering the laboratory,201
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participants were informed that they would receive a show-up fee of $5 upon completing the202
tasks and would also have the opportunity to earn extra payoffs based on their decisions and203
performance. However, they were not provided with any details about the experiment.204
4 Results205
We begin our analysis with descriptive statistics of the experimental results. Then, we ex-206
plore whether external assistance has a significant effect on the decision makers’ revealed207
preferences for monetary rewards and external help. Further, we test whether men and208
women react differently to external assistance using a difference-in-differences (DD) frame-209
work.210
We assume that rational agents have only one switching point from option A to option211
B during the MPL stage.5 After excluding 17 subjects who made multiple switches, a total212
of 160 subjects remain in the sample.6 A balance check of the sample is presented in Table213
1. The t-tests report that there are no significant differences between the treatment and214
control groups over a set of demographic covariates.215
Insert Table 1 here.216
In Table 2, we compare the average time spent per question between the treatment217
and control groups during the first stage. Introducing hints substantially improved the218
performance of both male and female participants. On average, participants in the treatment219
group spent significantly less time per question than participants in the control group. The220
difference in the time spent per question for the treatment and control group provides an221
objective measurement of the convenience provided by the external help. The experience222
in the first stage gives participants a reference point to make their switching choices in the223
MPL stage.224
5 The uniqueness of the switching point is proven by the theoretical framework provided in Appendix A.
6 Given the sample size for a 2 × 2 design, we are able to detect effect size of as small as 0.26 with 80%
of power.
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Insert Table 2 here.225
By design, there are two types of tasks in the second stage: another real-effort task similar226
to the first stage and a Raven’s test. The purpose of using two different tasks is to detect227
whether behavioral patterns induced in the first stage will be significantly adjusted based228
on the similarity of the tasks in the two stages. Mann-Whitney U tests (Table 3) of the key229
indicators—including switching patterns, self-reported beliefs on second-stage performance,230
accuracy rate per question, and time spent per question—in both stages show no significant231
differences between the tasks. This suggests that the induced treatment effect on switching232
patterns is not related to differences in the tasks.7 Next, we pool the data of the two types233
of tasks in the analysis of the second-stage behavior.234
Insert Table 3 here.235
4.1 Heterogeneous treatment effects on revealed preference236
We show the overall comparison of the switching point between the treated and control group237
in the first row of Table 4. Subjects who received external help in the first stage do not show238
significantly different switching patterns compared to the control group. On average, both239
groups switched from option A to B between the 8th and 9th decision row.240
Further investigation of gender differences in switching choices shows that the first-stage241
treatment affected the switching patterns of men and women in opposite ways, offsetting the242
overall effect.243
Insert Table 4 here.244
As shown in Table 4, treated men switched earlier than men in the control group. Male245
subjects in the control group, on average, made the switching decision between the 9th246
7 In the estimation of treatment effects within the DD framework, shown in Section 4.1, we further control
for session and task combination fixed effects to show that our treatment effect results are not contaminated
by differences in the tasks in the second stage.
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and 10th question, while treated male subjects switched around the 6th and 7th question.247
This difference is significant at the 5% level. In contrast, women tend to be reluctant to248
switch too early if they received hints in the first stage, although the difference is subject to249
large variation. Since the switching points have multiple peaks and skewed distributions, we250
check the robustness of our findings by building confidence intervals using the bootstrapping251
method (Figure 4).252
Insert Figure 4 here.253
In order to take a closer look at the behavioral patterns, we explore potential changes in254
the decision maker’s revealed preference (see Appendix A). Figure 5 displays the cumulative255
percentage of switching points at each decision row in the control and treatment groups.256
In both graphs, gender differences are more pronounced at the beginning, but gradually257
disappear at the end of the MPL.258
Insert Figure 5 here.259
For the control group, up until the 12th decision row, women’s cumulative percentage260
of switching points is always higher than men’s (panel a of Figure 5). Half of females who261
did not receive hints in the first stage switched before the 8th decision row, while this ratio262
for males is less than 35%. Men close the gap with women by the 13th decision row, where263
nearly 80% of both genders have switched. For the rest of the decisions (14th–17th), the264
cumulative percentage of switching points for men is slightly higher than women. This265
suggest that women tend to place a higher value in the potential monetary payout, while266
men tend to avoid higher effort.267
Interestingly, this pattern is reversed with the external help treatment (panel b in Figure268
5). Compared to the control group (without hints), women’s switching points were delayed,269
while men switched much earlier.8 Over 35% of male participants receiving hints in the first270
8In our theoretical model, this indicates that after being treated with hints, α decreases for women but
it increases for men, see the Appendix.
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stage chose to switch to option B at the first row of the MPL, compared to only 11% of271
females. More than 60% of male participants switched by the 9th decision row, compared to272
only 45% of females. Women closed the gap with men at around the 11th decision row. The273
distinctive change in the switching pattern by gender again indicates that men are more likely274
to switch later in the control, but they are more likely to switch earlier in the treatment.275
Meanwhile, a significant number of treated females converged to switching between the 8th276
and 12th decision row.277
We further test this relationship in the following difference-in-differences framework:278
Switching pointist = ωFemalei + θHintt + δ(Hintt · Femalei) + γs +Xistβ + ist, (1)
where γs is session fixed effects,
9 Femalei is gender indicator for subject i, and Xist captures279
individual characteristics (see Table 1). Hintt · Femalei is the interaction of external help280
treatment and the gender indicator, which is equal to 1 for female participants assigned to281
the treatment group and 0 otherwise. The parameter δ is our key difference-in-difference282
estimator.283
The point estimates are reported in Table 5. We implement the estimations by gradually284
adding controls for fixed effects of session or task type, and individual characteristics such as285
background covariates, self-evaluations and second-stage performance. 10 In response to the286
treatment of external help, female participants on average switched 4–5 decision rows later287
than male counterparts. The point estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level in288
column (1) and at the 1% level when controlling for session fixed effects in columns (2) and289
(3), and task type fixed effects in column (4). Therefore, using two different types of tasks290
(Real-effort task and Raven’s test) in the second stage does not affect the robustness of the291
estimates, which is in line with the previous analysis presented in Table 3.292
9 We also control for the task type fixed effects in some specification for robustness check.
10As per our design, we control for individual ability using the performance in the second stage. We argue
that individual ability is unlikely to be affected from the first stage to the second stage of the experiment,
particularly since both tasks are very similar.
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Insert Table 5 here.293
4.2 Exploring the Potential Causes for the Gender Gap in Reac-294
tion to External Assistance295
Thus far, our results have shown that the first stage hint treatment drives men and women296
to differ substantially in their switching patterns in the subsequent MPL stage. While male297
participants appear to place a higher value in the monetary payout, female participants seem298
to value more the convenience of external help. Next, we attempt to explore the possible299
mechanisms through which the hint treatment causes these divergent effects.300
4.2.1 Performance in the second stage301
We compare the performance of female and male subjects in the second stage (Table 6).302
Panel A reports the proportion of correct answers in the second stage overall and by gender.303
Although male subjects are willing to take a more difficult option, their performance is no304
different than the performance of females. This indifference holds even when the sample305
is divided by treatment assignment or by the number of questions selected in the second306
stage. In panel B, we compare the time spent per question (in seconds). Again, there are307
no significant differences by gender.308
Insert Table 6 here.309
In Figure 6, we further present the cumulative distribution of the proportion of correct310
answers for the overall sample. At each performance level, it depicts the share of individuals311
who solve at most that proportion of correct answers in the second stage. The distributions312
in the treatment and control conditions are shown in the two panels of Figure 7, respectively.313
Across the three graphs, the distributions closely track each other. It is unlikely that gender314
differences in ability drive the heterogeneous treatment effects.315
Insert Figures 6 and 7 here.316
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4.2.2 Cognitive bias317
We then test whether differences in individuals’ cognitive biases about their ability drives318
the results. At the end of the second stage and before being notified about their earnings,319
participants were asked to report their beliefs regarding their performance relative to others.320
Figure 8 shows the mean gender comparison of self-evaluated performance.11 The two-sided321
t-test suggests that there are no significant gender differences in the control group (p =322
0.303 ). However, there is a significant difference in the treatment group (p = 0.001 ). A323
difference-in-difference estimation showed similar results (Table 7). Clearly, the treatment324
significantly boosted the confidence and subjective beliefs of men, despite no significant325
differences in the actual performance between genders (Table 6).326
Insert Figure 8 and Table 7 here.327
The greater confidence shown by men provides suggestive evidence that cognitive bias328
could be driving the earlier switching patterns exhibited by men. In contrast, women’s329
self-evaluation on performance did not significantly change by the treatment. Women’s late330
switching is not driven by changes in their beliefs about their ability. While receiving the331
treatment induces men to become overconfident, regardless of their true ability, they signif-332
icantly underestimate the required effort to complete the task. Other possible mechanisms333
behind the results are examined in Appendix B.334
5 Conclusion and Discussion335
Everyday, people appear to rely more on external help from new technologies. In this336
laboratory experiment, we focused on the effects of external help on the trade-off between337
higher potential monetary rewards requiring greater effort and the convenience of lower effort338
from external assistance.339
11Subjects are asked to evaluate their performance relative to the rest of the participants in the same
session. 10 = better than 100% of others, 0 = no better than any others.
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In particular, we find that after receiving help men tend to overestimate their cognitive340
ability and underestimate the necessary effort to perform a real-effort task. Consequently,341
men are more likely to choose a more difficult task with higher potential earnings after being342
treated with external help, but they do not perform better than women.343
Women, on the contrary, tend to adjust their beliefs and decisions based on external344
supporting information in the opposite way. We argue that although external help may345
induce weak-performing women to utilize the convenience of external assistance, the possi-346
bility of strong-performing women to also develop a dependency cannot be ruled out (see347
the Appendix B for an elaborate analysis).348
To some extent, the observed treatment effect differences by gender may be useful to349
explain why women are more risk averse and avoid competition, while men actively engage350
in competitive behavior. According to our results, external assistance makes women more351
likely to depend on it. This, in turn, might drive women to behave more conservatively.352
The behavioral bias exhibited by men indicates a refusal to external help, which ultimately353
becomes financially costly by reducing their earnings (see the Appendix B and C).354
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Figures and Tables439
(a) Control Without Hints
(b) Treatment With Hints
Figure 1: An Example of the Real-Effort Task in the First Stage
19
(a) Control Without Hints (b) Treatment With Hints
Figure 2: An Example Question from the Raven’s Test Real-Effort Task
20













Note: 90% confidence intervals are based on bootstrapping with 1000 replications
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Figure 7: CDF of the Proportion of Correctly Solved Problems in the Second Stage: Treat-











Note: Error bars represent the 90% confidence interval.
Figure 8: Self-evaluation of Second-Stage Performance by Gender
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Table 1: Balance Check
Variables Control Treatment p-value
Age 22.72(.46) 23.31(.41) 0.342
Male 0.47(.06) 0.45(.05) 0.784
Undergraduate 2.66(.05) 2.54(.06) 0.123
Ideology to right(1-5) 2.91(.14) 3.08(.13) 0.367
Belong to a religion org. 0.32(.05) 0.34(.05) 0.866
Family income
<$15,000 0.12(.04) 0.12(.04) 0.944
($15,000, $35,000) 0.30(.05) 0.30(.05) 0.973
($35,000, $60,000) 0.14(.04) 0.20(.04) 0.306
($60,000, $100,000) 0.14(.04) 0.11(.03) 0.514
> $100,000 0.30(.05) 0.27(.05) 0.639
Obs. 77 83
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported for two-side t-tests.
Mann-Whitney U tests report similar results.
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Table 2: Time Spent per Question in the First Stage
Control Treatment p-value
All subjects 63.85(2.16) 19.61(1.04) 0.000
N=77 N=83
Male 62.47(3.22) 19.95(1.73) 0.000
N=36 N=37
Female 65.07(2.94) 19.35(1.27) 0.000
N=41 N=46
p-value 0.552 0.775
Notes: Time spent is measured in seconds. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-values
are reported for two-side t-tests. Mann-Whitney U tests report similar results.
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Table 3: Task Type Combination Comparison
Effort + Effort Effort + Raven p-value
Switch point 8.78(4.95) 8.24(5.20) 0.733
Self-evaluation 6.06(1.94) 6.11(1.68) 0.945
Time spending per question in the 1st stage 39.15(26.74) 42.05(26.67) 0.330
Time spending per question in the 2nd stage 36.06(9.93) 36.45(11.10) 0.789
Percent of correct answers in the 2nd stage 0.74(.18) 0.72(.15) 0.325
Obs. 63 97
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported for two-side
Mann-Whitney U test. t-tests report similar results. Self-evaluation measures the self-reported
evaluation of individual second stage performance compared to the rest of the participants in
the session. 10 = better than 100% of others, 0 = no better than any others. Time is measured
in seconds.
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Table 4: Switching Point Comparison
Control Treatment p-value
All subjects 8.68(.60) 8.24(.55) 0.592
N=77 N=83
Male 9.50(.77) 6.81(.85) 0.022
N=36 N=37
Female 7.95(.89) 9.39(.67) 0.194
N=41 N=46
p-value 0.198 0.018
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported for two-side t-tests.
Mann-Whitney U tests report similar results.
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Table 5: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Gender Gaps in Switching Points
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switching Point Switching Point Switching Point Switching Point
Hint Treatment -2.689** -2.735** -3.952*** -4.036***
(1.146) (1.155) (1.345) (1.308)
Female -1.549 -1.953* -2.490* -1.920
(1.175) (1.147) (1.270) (1.394)
Hint Treatment*Female 4.129** 4.272*** 5.804*** 5.357***
(1.599) (1.620) (1.692) (1.739)
Constant 9.500*** 9.702*** 6.110 7.442
(0.767) (0.791) (7.167) (7.301)
Session Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No
Task Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Demographic Variables No No Yes Yes
Observations 160 160 160 160
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
In the third column, we further control the self-reported evaluation and ability (proxied by the second stage
performance) to exclude any confounders from individual confidence.
Tobit estimation (not reported here) censoring at the switching point between 0 and 17 yields similar point
estimates across the three specifications.
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Table 6: Gender Differences in the Second Stage Performance
Female Male p-value
Panel A: percent of correct answers
Pooled 0.74(.02) 0.72(.02) 0.521
N=87 N=73
Control 0.75(.03) 0.73(.03) 0.589
N=41 N=36
Treatment 0.72(.03) 0.71(.02) 0.693
N=46 N=37
16 Questions 0.81(.03) 0.74(.04) 0.140
N=33 N=27
24 Questions 0.70(.02) 0.71(.02) 0.604
N=54 N=46
Panel B: time spending per question
Pooled 35.24(1.16) 37.57(1.21) 0.167
Treatment 34.15(1.66) 38.14(1.38) 0.077
Control 36.45(1.60) 36.99(2.02) 0.835
16 Questions 33.07(2.40) 38.14(2.45) 0.148
24 Questions 36.56(1.14) 37.24(1.29) 0.695
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported for two-side t-tests. Mann-
Whitney U tests report similar results. Time is measured in seconds.
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Table 7: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Gender Gaps in Self-reported Performance
(1) (2)
Self-evaluation Self-evaluation








Session Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Demographic Variables No Yes
Obs. 160 160
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Self-evaluation measures the self-reported evaluation
of individual second stage performance compared to the rest of the participants in the session. 10 = better than
100% of others, 0 = no better than any others.
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Appendices440
Appendix A: Analytical Framework441
To incorporate external assistance into a simple utility-maximizing framework that facilitates442
the estimation of the treatment effects of external assistance, we assume that a decision443
maker maximizes his/her utility by trading off between potential monetary rewards and the444
convenience from a lower level of effort. This trade-off is revealed by the choice of alternatives445
A or B through the 17 MPL choice pairs.446
Theory447
Consider a canonical Cobb-Douglas utility function in which each agent, i, trades-off between448
monetary payoff and “leisure”:449
Ui = M
αiL1−αi , (2)
where M refers to the expected monetary payoff; the budget constraint during the second450
stage of the experiment is represented by W = L + Ehint + Enohint, where L indicates451
individual leisure.12 A subject can allocate his/her total budget into three parts: the effort452
used to solve questions with hints (Ehint), the effort used to solve questions without hints453
(Enohint), and the rest from which subjects can derive utility as “leisure.” With 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,454
1− α measures the agent’s subjective valuation of the relative importance of “leisure.”455
The expected monetary payoff for a risk-neutral subject is the expected earnings from456
both types of questions: M = H ·Prhint+ (TQ−H) ·Prnohint, where Prhint and Prnohint are457
the probabilities of correctly solving questions with and without hints, respectively, while458
H and TQ are the number of questions with hints and the total number of questions for459
each option. We assume that Prhint > Prnohint. In our sample, the actual probabilities460
can be obtained from the proportion of correctly solved questions in the second stage (i.e.,461
Prhint = 85% and Prnohint = 61%).
13
462
Without any loss of generality, we define k as the required effort per question without463
hints. Time spent on each question can be viewed as a measurement for devoted effort. In464
the first stage, subjects take on average 20 seconds to solve each hint-facilitated question and465
64 seconds for questions without hints. Then we assume the effort for each hint-facilitated466
question is γ ∗ k, where γ = 20/64 ≈ 0.31 (see Table 2).467
12We interpret the total endowment W of each subject as a person’s energy or total cognitive load, and
we assume that this is likely to be similar over the participants in our sample.
13We use the exact probabilities to simplify the following derivation. The choice of these probabilities only
affects the switching points and the magnitude of the treatment effects; it does not change the predictions
and hypotheses associated with the theory.
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With the log transformation of equation 2, we obtain the additive utility function for468
choosing option A and B as469
V (A) = α · ln(0.85 ·H(A) + 0.61 · (TQ(A)−H(A))) + (1− α) · ln(W − 0.31 · k ·H(A)− k · (TQ(A)−H(A)))
(3)
and470
V (B) = α · ln(0.85 · 8 + 0.61 · (TQ(B)− 8)) + (1− α) · ln(W − 0.31 · k · 8− k · (TQ(B)− 8)) (4)
For example, in the first row of the MPL, H(A) = 16, TQ(A) = 16, H(B) = 8, and471
TQ(B) = 24. Define F ≡ V (A)−V (B). Then an agent chooses A if F > 0 and B otherwise.472
As a result, subjects would make the switch from option A to B when F changes sign from473
positive to negative or vice versa. Approximately, at the switching point we should have474
the condition F ≈ 0. For a generic utility maximizer, this condition yields the following475
equality:476
α · ln(0.24 ·H(A) + 9.76) + (1− α) · ln(W − 0.31 · k ·H(A)− k · (16−H(A)))
=α · ln(16.56) + (1− α) · ln(W − 2.48 · k − 16 · k)
(5)
By implicit differentiation of equation 5, we have ∂H(A)/∂α = −Fα/FH(A), where477
FH(A) = α · 0.24
0.24 ·H(A) + 9.76 + (1− α) ·
0.69 · k
W − 0.31 · k ·H(A)− k · (16−H(A)) (6)
and478
Fα = ln(0.24 ·H(A) + 9.76)− ln(16.56)− ln(W + 0.69 · k ·H(A)− 16 · k) + ln(W − 18.48 · k) (7)
It is straightforward to show that FH(A) > 0 and Fα < 0, since H(A) ∈ [0, 16], which479
further yield ∂H(A)/∂α > 0.480
Property 1 Participants have at most one switching point from option A to option B.481
By design, the number of hints in option A decreases for every subsequent decision.482
FH(A) > 0 indicates that F is monotonically increasing in the number of hints ranging from483
0 to 16, and the utility of option A is descending in the rows. This suggests that the switching484
direction between the two alternatives goes from option A to option B and the switching485
point is unique conditional on a given α. If a subject preferred option B over option A in the486
nth row, he/she would always choose option B after the nth row. Except for some subjects487
with extremely low α, who may never switch, theory predicts a unique switching point from488
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option A to B.489
Property 2 A higher α results in earlier switching from option A to option B.490
This prediction is a result of the inequality condition ∂H(A)/∂α > 0 shown in section491
5. Intuitively, it means that the position at which participants switch from option A to B is492
determined by the individual’s evaluation of monetary rewards relative to the convenience of493
lower effort from the hint-facilitated questions. The lower a participant values the monetary494
payoff (smaller α), the more likely he/she would continue to enjoy the convenience of an easy495
task and switch at a later point (smaller H(A)).496
Property 3 Participants who switch from option A to option B at the first decision have497
the highest magnitude of α.498
The participants who switch from option A to option B at the first decision will always499
choose option B with higher potential monetary rewards along the MPL, regardless of the500
difference in the number of hints between the two options. This is because this type of501
participant weighs the expected payoff significantly higher than the convenience of lower502
effort from external help (greater α).503
Our hypotheses include two arguments below.504
Hypothesis 1 Being treated with external assistance in the first stage can influence an505
individual’s trade-off between monetary rewards and dependence on external assistance by506
working on a task with less effort.507
Receiving the external assistance in the first stage will most likely affect how individuals508
evaluate monetary rewards and the disutility from effort, which can be potentially mitigated509
by the hints. On the one hand, the external assistance in the first stage may result in510
stronger confidence and more emphasis on the potential monetary reward (greater α). As511
such, participants treated with hints in the first stage would be more likely to choose the512
more challenging option (i.e., option B with more questions but not necessarily more hints)513
in the second stage. Equivalently, the decision makers in the treatment switch from option514
A to B earlier than the control group. On the other hand, the external help in the first stage515
might also trigger an individual’s dependency on the convenience generated by the lower516
amount of required effort (i.e., higher amount of external help) and choose option A, which517
is easier to complete.518
Hypothesis 2 Receiving external assistance has different treatment effects for female519
and male participants.520
This hypothesis is supported by the discussion in Sections 1 and 2, suggesting that the521
external assistance treatment in the first stage will drive women to be more likely to have a522
smaller α and switch to option B later than men.523
36
Appendix B: Other mechanisms524
Did ability affect the behavior of men and women differently?525
In this section we further test whether the heterogeneous treatment effects by gender are526
related to different ways in which natural abilities determine men and women’s switching527
choices during the MPL. Following the reasoning in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we528
analyze the switching decisions conditional on performance in the second stage.14529
The four panels in Figure C1 present the average switching points of men and women in530
the treatment and control groups conditional on their performance quartile for the questions531
answered in the second stage. Recall that option B always has higher potential payoff and532
greater (or equal) number of difficult questions (non-hint-facilitated questions) than option533
A; before the 9th decision, option A always has more questions with hints than option534
B. Conditional on the same level of revealed preference, individuals with better (worse)535
performance level in the difficult questions should switch earlier (later), which would result536
in a downward-sloping pattern of the average switching point against the performance level537
in panels a and c.538
In the case of easy questions, it is not obvious how an individual behaves according to539
his/her ability, since individuals with better performance in the difficult questions are also540
likely to be good at the easy questions, but not necessarily the other way around. If an541
individual has relatively better performance in both types of questions, it is still better for542
him/her to switch early, but if he/she can only perform well in the simple questions or in543
none of the question types, he/she would still be better off by switching later.544
Across all the four graphs, the switching patterns do not correspond to the individual545
ability proxied by the performance quartile. This result suggests that cognitive bias might be546
critical to explaining the observed gender differences in the treatment effects. Overall, receiv-547
ing the treatment in the first stage shifted the average switching point by each performance548
level to a later point for women but to an earlier point for men.549
We first analyze the case of questions without hints in panels a and c in Figure C1.550
In the control condition, women with the lowest ability in the difficult questions on average551
switched at the 7th decision row, while treated women delayed switching to the 11th decision.552
For women with better performance in questions without hints, the treatment drove them553
to make a later switch by a smaller margin than those with weak performance. Women554
in the 2nd and 3rd quartile of performance level switched on average at around the 8th555
14Note that the revealed preference of switching pattern is observed before the implementation of the
second-stage game. Along the 17 decisions in the MPL, the decision selected for implementation is randomly
determined. Second-stage performance is therefore exogenous to the individuals’ switching decision in the
MPL.
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decision in both treatment and control conditions. However, treated women with the highest556
performance in the difficult questions delayed switching by about two more units than the557
control cohort, which indicates that strong-performing women are still switching later.558
The switching point delay pattern among weak-performing women might suggest two559
potential channels for the treatment effects. First, it is possible that the treatment helps560
weak-performing women to reasonably update their beliefs about their own ability and adjust561
the switching decision to match their true ability. Second, weak-performing women in the562
treatment group might derive stronger dependency on the external assistance than women563
in the control condition. However, it is obvious that strong-performing women’s switch564
point is not rational, the induced dependency on the convenience of external assistance from565
treatment could be the reason driving them to make later switching decision.566
Interestingly, the treatment seems to work very differently for men. As seen in panel567
a of Figure C1, the treatment led men in the lowest-performing quartile to switch even568
earlier than women in the highest-performing quartile, providing strong evidence that men569
are over-confident about their true abilities.570
In the case of hint-facilitated questions (panels b and d in Figure C1), treated women571
with relatively low performance level delayed their switching point by 2 to 3 units compared572
to women in the control group. It is likely that individuals with low ability in the hint-573
facilitated questions also perform worse than others in the questions without hints. We574
test this correlation using the proportion of correctly solved questions for weak-performing575
women.15 The reported statistics of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and a two-sided t-test show576
that the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.197 and p = 0.311 ). Again, treated577
females with weak performance (1st and 2nd quartile) in the easy questions made switching578
decisions more consistent with their true ability but also developed stronger dependency on579
the convenience of the simplified task. Overall, treated women with the higher performance580
(3rd and 4th quartile) in the easy questions also delayed their average switching points, with581
women in performance level 3rd switching late by 2 units.582
We then compare differences in switching points between weak- and strong-performing583
women in both types of questions during the second stage.16 This difference is not significant584
(two-sided t-test, p = 0.191 ) for strong-performing women but it is significant at the 10%585
level (two-sided t-test, p = 0.077 ) for weak-performing women. The corresponding test586
statistics for males are different. The difference is significant for both strong-performing587
men (two-sided t-test, p =0.039 ) and weak-performing men (two-sided t-test, p = 0.009 )588
15Weak performance refers to a performance worse than the 3rd quartile.
16For questions with/without hints, in the following tests weak-performance refers to performance level
of 1 or 2 and strong-performance refers to performance levels of 3 or 4.
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at the 5% level.589
Were the heterogenous switching patterns chosen out of profit maximization?590
To further exclude the mechanism that profit maximization is confounded with dependency,591
we analyze the share of participants earning positive profits in the second stage conditional592
on performance level. Recall that participants were required to answer at least 75% of the593
tasks correct in order to be paid in the second round. If women with the lowest ability594
strategically adjust their switching point in order to maximize their profit, we would observe595
a significant increase in the probability of obtaining positive earnings. As shown in Appendix596
Figure C2, this is not the case. The reported statistics of a two-sided t-test indicates the597
difference is not statistically significant either by performance level or in the pooled data. For598
the lowest performing men and women, adjustment in their switching pattern after receiving599
help, actually decreases the probability of receiving positive earnings, although the statistical600
test is not significant.601
Figure C3 presents the aggregate share of men and women who earned positive payment602
in the second stage. Both genders have no significant differences between the treatment603
and control, which further exclude profit maximization as the underlying mechanism for the604
observed heterogeneous treatment effects.605
Taken together, the treatment of external drive women overall to switch late. Although606
this could lead women with low ability to make their switching decisions more related to607
their own ability, it might imply that treatment drives the high-performing women to de-608
velop stronger dependency on an easier task.17 The behavioral bias from the treatment609
drives men—especially weak-performing men—to switch too early. Given the findings of the610
discrepancy between choices and abilities, we know that besides the monetary payoff, each611
individual attaches a different degree of importance to the convenience of an easier task while612
making switching decisions. This subjective valuation might be affected by the treatment613
intervention, so even men and women with the same ability respond to the treatment in very614
different ways due to the induced cognitive bias.18615
17Though we observe treated women with the highest performance level also conservatively switch later,
the difference is not statistically significant due large variation. It is possible that strong-performing women
also develop a tendency to depend on the convenience of an easy task, but with a smaller magnitude compared
to weak-performing women.
18See the Appendix A for the theoretical part, this subjective valuation is measured in α.
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Figure C2: Share of Positive Profits in the Second Stage Conditional on Performance: Treat-











Control: Without Hint Treatment: With Hint
Note: Error bars represent the 90% confidence interval.
Figure C3: Share of Positive Profits in the Second Stage by Treatment.
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Appendix D: Experimental Instructions617
General Instruction618
Before the session begins, you will carefully read the basic instruction in 15 minutes. Please619
feel free to ask questions if you are confused. During the experiment you are not allowed to620
communicate with other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We621
will come to answer your questions.622
Sometimes you may have to wait a short while before the experiment continues. Thanks623
for your patience and cooperation.624
Upon the completion of the experiment, you will receive a participation fee of $5. You625
will also receive some extra payment based on your responses to the questions. At the end626
of the experiment your total earnings will be paid out to you in cash.627
Before the end of the session, we will ask you some general questions about yourself.628
Your responses are helpful in that they can be used to explain some of the decisions you629
make in the experimental exercises. Please note that your responses will not be linked to630
your name, nor made available to anyone outside the research team. Your ID number is used631
to match your responses so that they are not confused with anyone else’s, and will be used632
to determine your earnings from the experiment.633
We ask you not to talk with anyone else today except for the designated researchers634
conducting this experiment.635
We expect that the entire session will take about one hour. Your participation is com-636
pletely voluntary. You may ask questions at any time during the experiment.637
First Stage Instruction638
In this stage, you are going to work on one of the two types of tasks. One type of task639
will list questions with hints which will assist you to finish them, while the other type of task640
will list questions without hints. A sample for both type of tasks will be on the next screen641
for your reference.642
After you review the sample question, the computer will randomly, with probability one643
half, assign you to work on either one type of the tasks.644
This experiment is completely anonymous: neither the other participants, nor the orga-645
nizer will be able to know what your decision was.646
Questions in both of the tasks require you to count the number of occurrences of a pre-647
specified letter appearing in a table of several lines’ random combination of 26 letters. There648
are 50 letters in each line, you will need to go through all these lines to correctly count the649
frequency of this exact letter.650
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In the type of task without hints, you are asked to go through every letter across these651
lines counting for the number of the requested letter. In the type of task with hints, all652
irrelevant letters will be suppressed to narrow down the counting area with the purpose of653
assisting you to easily complete the task.654
There are 10 questions in total and you have to correctly answer all the questions within655
15 minutes to earn $10.656
Participants see the sample question on the screen (Figure 1). In this example, they are657
asked to count the number of letter ‘h’.658
After they finish the first-stage task of ten questions, they enter the second stage659
The Second Stage Instructions (Real Effort Sessions)660
PLEASE CAREFULLY READ BELOW INSTRUCTION AND EXAMPLE IN THE661
NEXT PAGE SINCE IT MATTERS FOR YOUR FINAL PAYOUT.662
Now you are in the second stage. In this stage, you are going to work on another batch663
of task. Each question requires you to find a pre-specified number from a table of several664
lines’ random number combination. There are 50 numbers in each line, you will need to go665
through all these lines to correctly count the number of times the pre-specified digit appears.666
Please click Proceed to see the sample question.667
Then participants see an example similar with the first stage with replacement letters by668
numbers. The participants in the raven test sessions see the following instructions instead.669
The Second Stage Instructions (Raven Test Sessions)670
PLEASE CAREFULLY READ BELOW INSTRUCTION AND EXAMPLE IN THE671
NEXT PAGE SINCE IT MATTERS FOR YOUR FINAL PAYOUT.672
Now you are in the second stage. In this stage, you are going to work on another task673
of test questions. Each question requires you to select the one choice in the answer panel674
that best fits in the blank position of the question. Please click Proceed to see the sample675
question.676
In the below tables, you will need to select the best fit answer. The left panel is the677
example of question without hint. A full set of choices will be presented to you. The right678
panel is the example of question with hint. Some irrelevant choices will be suppressed with679
the purpose of assisting you to narrow down choice pool.680
Multiple Pricing List Instruction681
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There is a list of option pairs, “A” and “B”. Option “A” has 16 questions and option “B”682
has 24 questions.683
Both option “A” and “B” have some questions with hint and others without hint. The684
number of hints for option “A” varies across the list. The number of hints for option “B” is685
8 and keeps constant through the list.686
You are required to check the one option that you prefer to implement for EACH option687
pair in the list. Only ONE pair in the list will be randomly chosen for execution and your688
choice of option in that pair will be presented to you for implementation later.689
You first have 10 minutes to make selections across the list, then 20 minutes to finish the690
task.691
You will see the details in the next screen.692
Each correct answer will be worth $1.693
To earn payout, the number of mistakes that you are allowed to make is at most one694
fourth of the total number of questions. Specifically, in Option A you are ONLY allowed695
to give at most 4 wrong answers and in Option B you are ONLY allowed to give at most 6696
wrong answers. You will receive the payment corresponding to the number of your correct697
answers, only if your number of correct answers exceeds 12 (including 12) in Option A and698
18 (including 18) in Option B. Otherwise, you will NOT receive payment for this stage.699
You will be ONLY aware of how many correct answers in the end of this stage. No700
notification will show at each question.701
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